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Abstract
Physicians are supposed to serve patientsinterests, but some are
more inclined to do so than others. This paper studies how the system
of health care provision a¤ects the allocation of patients to physicians
when physicians di¤er in altruism. We show that allowing for pri-
vate provision of health care, parallel to (free) treatment in a National
Health Service, benets all patients. It enables rich patients to obtain
higher quality treatment in the private sector. Because the altruis-
tic physicians infer that in their absence, NHS patients receive lower
treatment quality than private sector patients, they optimally decide
to work in the NHS. Hence, after allowing for private provision, the
remaining (relatively poor) NHS patients are more likely to receive the
superior treatment provided by altruistic physicians. We also show,
however, that allowing physicians to moonlight, i.e. to operate in both
the NHS and the private sector simultaneously, nullies part of these
benecial e¤ects for the poorest patients.
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1 Introduction
In the ongoing debate on the desirability of private provision of health care,
one of the arguments voiced by opponents is that the private sector will
attract the best physicians, implying that patients who have to rely on
publicly provided care face a decrease in health care quality. In this paper,
however, it is argued that if physicians di¤er in their concern for patient
welfare, then those who care most about their patients actually prefer to
provide high-quality treatment in the public sector rather than in a private
practice. Ever since the ancient Greeks, it is common practice in many
countries that physicians have to pledge to act in the interest of their patients
before entering the profession. For instance, the Declaration of Geneva, a
modern version of the Oath of Hippocrates adopted in 1948 by the General
Assembly of the World Medical Association, contains the phrase the health
of my patient will be my rst consideration. Similarly, the General Medical
Council in the UK instructs doctors to make the care of your patient your
rst concern(General Medical Council, 2001).
There is ample anecdotal evidence of physicians living up to their oath.
In the wake of extreme events, such as the September 11 attacks and hur-
ricane Katrina, many physicians work around the clock to provide care.1
Médecins Sans Frontières is able to nd hundreds of health professionals
willing to work in remote, undeveloped regions of the world, despite o¤er-
ing little remuneration. In a less extreme setting, over 70 percent of NHS
employees in England claim to work more than their contractual hours, the
majority working unpaid overtime. The most commonly mentioned rea-
son for working overtime is to provide the best care I can for patients
(Healthcare Commission, 2006). This suggests that at least some health
professionals are willing to step beyond the boundaries of their contractual
duties to provide better care. When we accept that physicians may di¤er in
altruism towards their patients, we can ask: which patients benet from the
altruistic physicians? And relating to the discussion on private provision of
health care, how is the allocation of these benets a¤ected by the system of
1Several health professionals describe the events in New Orleans in Katrinas aftermath
in the New England Journal of Medicine, Volume 353(15); see also CNN (2005).
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health care provision?
This paper develops a model in which patients di¤er in income and
physicians di¤er in altruism to analyse how di¤erent systems of health care
provision a¤ect the allocation of patients to doctors and, hence, patients
welfare. We compare a purely public system of health care provision, where
all patients are treated in a National Health Service, to a mixed system
of health care provision, where a perfectly competitive private health care
sector exists parallel to the NHS. We show that allowing for private provision
of health care benets both rich and poor patients.
We distinguish between altruistic and regular physicians. Only altruistic
physicians intrinsically care about patient welfare, but since their number
is limited some patients will be treated by a regular doctor. Under both
systems of health care provision, patients can obtain treatment for free in
the NHS, nanced through taxation, and physicians working for the NHS
have to adhere to a minimum treatment quality. Patients who, under the
mixed system, receive treatment in the private sector must pay the price of
treatment themselves.2 As any patient who is not treated by an altruistic
physician will be treated by a regular physician, each altruistic physician
infers that he can increase patient welfare by providing better treatment
and, if treating patients in the private sector, by asking a lower price than
regular physicians.
In the NHS, regular physicians provide the minimum treatment quality,
whereas altruistic physicians optimally provide better treatment. We assume
that in the NHS patients are randomly matched to physicians, and patients
and physicians cannot observe each otherstype. Hence, under purely public
provision of health care, every patient has the same probability of receiving
treatment from an altruistic physician. Under mixed provision, physicians
decide whether to work for the NHS or set up a private practice and patients
choose whether to obtain treatment in the NHS or buy treatment in the
private sector. Competition ensures that regular physicians in the private
sector must be equally well o¤ as in the NHS. Obviously, free treatment in
2Allowing for private health insurance does not a¤ect the results if only rich patients
buy insurance. Propper (2000) shows that insurance coverage in the UK indeed increases
in income.
2
the NHS implies that the only way to attract patients to a private practice
is to o¤er high-quality treatment, and only rich patients are willing to pay
for high quality.3
We show that all patients are better o¤ under mixed provision than un-
der purely public provision, i.e. allowing for private provision of health care
benets both rich and poor patients. Rich patients are able to buy high-
quality treatment in the private sector. As in Besley and Coate (1991), this
leads to lower cost of public provision and, hence, to lower taxes. Altruistic
physicians face the choice between improving the utility of a patient who
otherwise pays for high-quality treatment in the private sector and provid-
ing higher treatment quality to a patient who otherwise receives low-quality
treatment in the NHS. As the marginal benet of additional treatment qual-
ity is higher for NHS patients than for private sector patients, working in
the NHS is more rewarding for an altruistic physician. Hence, despite the
opportunity to open up a private practice under mixed provision, altruistic
physicians choose to stay in the NHS. This implies that the departure of rich
patients benets the remaining NHS patients (that is, the poor patients) by
increasing their probability of receiving the superior treatment provided by
altruistic physicians. Hence, since the bestdoctors remain in the NHS, al-
lowing for private provision of health care increases the expected treatment
quality received by patients in the NHS.
This mechanism implies that not only allowing but also encouraging
people to go to the private sector may have favourable consequences for
NHS patients. Focussing on redistribution, Cullis and Jones (1985) show
that subsidising private treatment can benet those who do not make use of
the subsidy through lower taxes, as long as the cost of the subsidy are smaller
than the decrease in total cost of public provision.4 In our framework, there
is an additional benecial e¤ect of subsidising treatment in the private sector
from the point of view of patients in the NHS. As the subsidy increases the
3Apart from the distinction between altruistic and regular physicians, our setup is close
to Besley and Coate (1991), who study the redistributional e¤ects of public provision of
private goods.
4Relatedly, Hoel and Sæther (2003) argue that a waiting list for treatment in the public
sector can be benecial to the poor despite the cost of waiting, as it drives rich people to
the private sector.
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number of patients who opt for treatment in the private sector, the remaining
patients in the NHS have a higher probability of receiving the high-quality
treatment provided by altruistic physicians.
Lastly, we analyse the e¤ect of allowing physicians to moonlight, i.e. to
operate in both the NHS and the private sector simultaneously. This gives
physicians the possibility to transfer patients from the NHS to their private
practice. Barros and Olivella (2005) and González (2005) analyse physi-
ciansincentive to transfer the most protable patients (cream-skimming).
Ma (2004) and Biglaiser and Ma (2006) argue that moonlighting increases
e¢ ciency, as it allows for bargaining between regular doctors and their NHS
patients to arrive at better treatment in a private practice.5 In our frame-
work, allowing for moonlighting is benecial for some patients, but harmful
for the poorest patients. The option of being transferred to a private prac-
tice when matched to a regular doctor induces more relatively rich patients
to go initially to the NHS, as they need not fear receiving the minimum
treatment quality anymore. This implies that for individual patients, the
probability of being treated by an altruistic physician decreases. As the poor
cannot a¤ord a transfer to a private practice, they are adversely a¤ected by
moonlighting.
The next section discusses some related literature. Section 3 describes
the model, and Section 4 compares purely public provision to mixed provi-
sion of health care. In Section 4, we also discusses the scope for subsidising
private health care, and analyse the e¤ects of moonlighting. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Related literature
The assumption that some health care professionals are altruistic is not un-
common in the literature. Altruistic physicians have featured in several stud-
ies of the agency relation between physicians, patients, and/or purchasers of
5Brekke and Sørgard (2006) argue that if doctors have market power, so that they
can increase the prots from their private practice by reducing their labour supply, then
allowing doctors to work in the private sector alongside a salaried job in the NHS may
lead to a reduction in total health care capacity.
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health care.6 In Chalkley and Malcomson (1998), doctors care about treat-
ment quality and can reduce the cost of treatment by exerting e¤ort. Build-
ing on Ellis and McGuire (1986), they derive the optimal mix of prospective
payment and cost-reimbursement when both e¤ort and quality are unob-
servable to the purchaser. Jack (2005) generalises the results of Chalkley
and Malcomson (1998) by deriving the optimal reimbursement scheme when
physicians di¤er in altruism, see also Choné and Ma (2006).7 Ma (2004) and
Biglaiser and Ma (2006) assume that a group of dedicated doctors always
provides high-quality treatment in the public sector and analyse the e¤ects
of allowing regular doctors to be employed in the public and the private sec-
tor simultaneously. In contrast to these papers, the current paper assumes
that quality of treatment is veriable and so does not look at optimal incen-
tive schemes. Instead, we analyse how the system of health care provision
a¤ects which patients receive treatment from altruistic physicians.
As to the source of physiciansaltruism, Arrow (1963) and Evans (1984)
argue that physiciansconcern for patient welfare has developed to reduce
the adverse e¤ects arising from the information asymmetry between patients
and physicians. One aim of the extensive training of physicians is to install
a sense of moral obligation towards patients into their beliefs and norms,
so that they abstain from abusing their superior knowledge. These ethical
considerations can be linked to the identity approach of Akerlof and Kranton
(2000), where people prefer to behave like people in theirsocial class are
supposed to behave. Applied to physicians, this would imply that physicians
act in the interest of patients so as to comply with the ideal of a good
physician.
Our setup is close to the literature on the redistributive aspects of public
provision of private goods. In Besley and Coate (1991), the poor obtain a
free but low-quality good in the public sector, whereas the rich prefer to
6For a discussion of the interdependence of physiciansand patientsutility, see Mooney
and Ryan (1993). McGuire (2000) surveys the physician agency literature.
7Heyes (2005) argues that if nurses di¤er in their intrinsic motivation to provide care,
paying higher wages may attract less motivated personnel. For similar arguments in a
more general context, see Dixit (2002) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2005). Besley and Ghatak
(2005), Delfgaauw and Dur (2004), and Francois (2000) argue that organisationsability
to attract workers who value working for the organisation reduces the need for providing
monetary incentives.
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buy a high-quality good in the private sector. Even when public provision
is nanced by a head tax, this has redistributional consequences, as the
taxes paid by the rich help to pay for the provision of the good to the
poor. This mechanism also operates in an optimal taxation framework,
see e.g. Blomquist and Christiansen (1995) and Boadway and Marchand
(1995). Epple and Romano (1996a,b) and Gouveia (1997) show in a median
voter setting that there is always a majority favouring a mixed system of
public and private provision over a system of either solely public or solely
private provision.8 Our contribution lies in the addition of di¤erences in
providersconcern for customer welfare, which turn out to strengthen the
case for mixed provision. Moreover, we show that it increases the scope for
subsidising private provision.
3 The model
There is a population of patients of size P .9 Patients di¤er only in income
Y 2 [YL; YH ]. Income is continuously distributed according to density func-
tion f(Y ) with cumulative distribution function F (Y ). Each patient needs
treatment from a physician; physicians cannot observe a patients income.
Patientsutility u(y; q) depends on the quality of their treatment q and on
the consumption of a composite good y. For simplicity, we assume that
utility is separable in income and treatment quality:
u(y; q) = U(y) + V (q) (1)
Utility is increasing and concave in both elements: Uy > 0; Uyy < 0; Vq >
0; Vqq < 0.
We distinguish between two systems of health care provision. In the
purely public system, treatment is provided within a National Health Ser-
vice only. In the mixed system of health care provision, there is private
provision of health care parallel to the NHS. Under both systems, treat-
8Jofre-Bonet (2000) models strategic interaction between public and private providers
of health care, and concludes that mixed provision outperforms both purely private and
purely public provision.
9We assume that there are no healthy people. None of the results is a¤ected if each
person needs treatment with a given probability.
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ment in the NHS can be obtained free of charge. The NHS runs a balanced
budget, and the cost of public provision of health care are nanced by a
proportional income tax  . We assume that treatment quality is veriable.
Physicians working in the NHS are obliged to provide at least treatment
quality q and receive a salary from the NHS. Under the mixed system, pa-
tients and physicians choose between the NHS and the perfectly competitive
private sector. In the private sector, physicians o¤er one or more bundles
of treatment quality and price and patients must pay the price of treatment
themselves.10
There are two types of physicians: regular and altruistic physicians. Each
physician treats at most one patient. In total, there are su¢ cient physicians
to treat all patients, but there is a limited number N < P of altruistic
physicians. Hence, some patients are treated by regular physicians. For
convenience, we normalise the utility of both physician types from working
outside health care to zero.
Regular doctors have standard preferences:
ZR = w   c(q)
where w is the nancial reward a doctor obtains for treating a patient, and
c(q) denotes the e¤ort cost of providing treatment of quality q, with deriva-
tives cq > 0 and cqq  0. Thus, providing higher treatment quality becomes
increasingly more costly.11 As there are su¢ cient doctors, the participation
constraint of regular doctors will be binding. This implies that for providing
treatment of quality q, regular doctors must receive compensation w = c(q).
The preferences of altruistic doctors are similar to the preferences of
regular doctors, except that an altruistic doctor to some extent cares about
patientsutility. More specically, an altruistic doctor values increasing the
utility of a patient above the level of utility this patient would have obtained
10Allowing for private health insurance, such that the cost of treatment in the private
sector is zero at the point of consumption, does not a¤ect the results, as long as only
rich patients buy insurance. Propper (2000) shows that the likelihood of taking private
insurance in the UK indeed increases in income.
11Observe that doctors utility is assumed to be linear in income, whereas patients
utility is concave in income. This is solely for simplicity, and does not a¤ect any of the
results qualitatively.
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elsewhere. Equivalently, altruistic doctors may care about total patient
welfare, which increases when an altruistic doctor provides his patient with
greater utility than this patient would have received had she not been treated
by this doctor.12 This is captured by the utility function of altruistic doctors:
ZA = w   c(q) + [u(y; q)  uo] (2)
where  is the weight of altruism in the utility function and uo is the outside
optionof the patient. Clearly, patients will not accept lower utility from
treatment by an altruistic doctor than uo. Hence, the last term in the utility
function of altruistic doctors is nonnegative. Altruistic doctors can increase
the utility of their patient by providing higher treatment quality than this
patient would otherwise receive, and, if working in the private sector, by
asking a lower price for treatment.13 Notice that altruistic physicians care
about the absolute increase in utility, irrespective of whether the patient is
rich or poor. Allowing altruistic physicians to place greater weight on the
utility of poor patients than on the utility of rich patients strengthens the
results.
Whereas physicians working in the NHS receive a salary, physicians in
the private sector are free to choose the price of their treatment. We impose
one reasonable restriction on physicianschoices:
Assumption 1: w  0.
Assumption 1 precludes situations where physicians are so altruistic that
when they work in the private sector, they charge negative prices. In reality,
physicians may be tempted to, on top of free treatment, slip some money to
very needy patients. This, however, must be the exception rather than the
rule, as one cannot live on altruistic utility alone.14
We assume that the process of matching patients and physicians is in-
12This implies that the altruistic physicians inhabit pure altruism, as in Francois (2000).
Instead, in Delfgaauw and Dur (2004), Glazer (2004) and Besley and Ghatak (2005) agents
are impurely altruistic, which implies that they care about their personal contribution to
output (warm-glow).
13Given that patientsutility is concave in income, altruistic doctors would prefer spread-
ing money over all (poor) patients rather than granting one patient a large reduction in
the price of treatment. We assume that physicians do not engage in redistribution.
14An equivalent assumption is made in Ma (2004) and Choné and Ma (2006).
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stantaneous and costless, and we abstract from coordination problems such
that each patient is matched to one physician. In the NHS, patients are
assigned randomly to physicians, and do not observe the type of their physi-
cian before treatment. We assume that if an altruistic physician wants to
work in the NHS, he is always matched to a patient. In the private sector,
patients are assigned to their most preferred type of physician with prob-
abilities depending upon supply and demand for this physician type. For
instance, if all altruistic physicians work in the private sector and M > N
patients want to be treated by an altruistic physician, then each of the M
patients has probability N=M to be matched to an altruistic physician and
the remainder is treated by a regular physician in the private sector.
4 Results
4.1 Purely public provision
Suppose that the NHS is the only provider of health care. The NHS enforces
the (exogenously given) minimum treatment quality q, and because there
are not su¢ cient altruistic physicians to treat all patients, the NHS must
employ regular physicians. To attract regular physicians, the NHS must
o¤er a wage w = c(q). Since regular physicians have no incentive to provide
better quality than q, patients with income Yi treated by a regular physician
in the NHS obtain utility u[(1 p)Yi; q]. Each altruistic physician infers that
if he does not treat a patient, one more patient will be treated by a regular
physician. Hence, patientsoutside option uo is the utility a patient obtains
from treatment by a regular physician. From (2), it follows that altruistic
doctors who provide treatment quality q are also willing to work in the
NHS for salary w = c(q). However, since altruistic physicians care about
patientsutility, they may choose to deviate from the treatment o¤ered by
regular physicians. Altruistic physicians cannot a¤ect the price of treatment
for the patient (which equals zero in the NHS), but may optimally decide
to provide better treatment quality.15 Note that if an altruistic doctor is
willing to provide better quality, he is also willing to accept a lower wage
15Allowing for a monetary transfer from a physician to his NHS patient does not a¤ect
the results.
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than regular doctors. In theory, the NHS could extract the rents of altruistic
doctors by o¤ering a wage scheme which is decreasing in treatment quality.
This seems unrealistic and di¢ cult to enforce, and hence we will assume
that the NHS sticks to one wage for all doctors: w = c(q). Total cost of
purely public provision of health care thus equals c(q)P , yielding tax rate
p = c(q)=
R YH
YL
Y f(Y )dY .
Substituting for w and uo in the utility function of altruistic physicians
(2) and taking account of the random matching of patients and physicians
gives:
ZA = c(q)  c(q) + 
Z YH
YL
fu[(1  p)Y; q]  u[(1  p)Y; q]gf(Y )dY (3)
An altruistic physician maximises utility with respect to q, subject to q  q.
Using (1), let qA be the resulting optimal level of treatment quality, as given
by rst-order condition:
 cq(qA) + Vq(qA) = 0 (4)
Note that qA does not depend on the (expected) income of the patient. Using
the treatment quality provided by regular physicians q, it follows from (4)
that altruistic physicians provide higher treatment quality than their less
altruistic colleagues if:
Vq(q) > cq(q) (5)
Otherwise, altruistic physicians o¤er the same treatment as regular physi-
cians. Hence, if altruistic physicians are su¢ ciently altruistic, i.e. if  is
su¢ ciently high, then they provide higher treatment quality than regular
physicians, thereby increasing both the utility of their patient and their own
utility. Throughout the paper, we will assume that condition (5) is satised.
It follows that patients have probability N=P to be treated by an altruis-
tic physician, in which case they receive treatment quality qA, and with
the remaining probability they obtain treatment quality q from a regular
physician.
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4.2 Mixed provision
Now suppose that a perfectly competitive private sector of health care provi-
sion exists parallel to the NHS. Each physician chooses whether to work for
the NHS or in the private sector, and each patient decides whether to obtain
treatment in the NHS or in a private practice. We focus on an equilibrium
where some patients are being treated in the private sector and others in
the NHS. We will show that in equilibrium, all altruistic physicians work in
the NHS, relatively poor patients receive treatment in the NHS, and rich
patients buy treatment in the private sector.
Since there are su¢ cient physicians, competition between regular physi-
cians ensures that they are indi¤erent between working in the NHS and
working in the private sector. In the previous subsection, we have seen that
regular physicians in the NHS provide treatment quality q and receive wage
w = c(q). This implies that regular physicians in a private practice are will-
ing to provide quality q at price w = c(q). Hence, a patient with income Yi
who buys treatment from a regular physician in the private sector maximises
utility (1), subject to the budget constraint y + c(q) = (1   m)Yi, where
m is the tax rate needed to cover the cost of public provision of health care
under the mixed system. Optimal treatment quality qi is implicitly given
by rst-order condition:
 cq(qi )Uy[(1  m)Yi   c(qi )] + Vq(qi ) = 0 (6)
This yields utility u[(1   m)Yi   c(qi ); qi ]. Concavity of U() and V ()
ensures that both treatment quality qi and consumption of the composite
good are increasing in income.
Obviously, the availability of free treatment quality q in the NHS implies
that patients are only willing to pay for treatment in the private sector
if the treatment quality they receive is su¢ ciently greater than q. This
immediately implies that the price regular physicians receive for treating a
patient in the private sector is higher than the wage a regular physician earns
when working in the NHS. The benets of these higher earnings, however,
are fully o¤set by the cost of providing higher treatment quality.
In the previous subsection we have seen that the optimal treatment qual-
11
ity provided by altruistic physicians in the NHS is independent of the (ex-
pected) income of patients in the public sector. Hence, given that condition
(5) is fullled, altruistic physicians who operate in the NHS optimally pro-
vide treatment quality qA, as implicitly dened by (4).
Lemma 1 describes patientschoice between treatment in the NHS and
treatment in the private sector.
Lemma 1 Consider any combination of treatment bundles o¤ered in the
private sector for which some patients choose treatment in the NHS and other
patients choose treatment in the private sector. There is one level of income
at which patients are indi¤erent between the NHS and the private sector.
Let YM denote this endogenously determined level of income. Patients with
income Yi > YM buy treatment in the private sector, whereas patients with
income Yi < YM receive treatment in the NHS.
Proof. Suppose that patients in the NHS have probability  to be matched
to an altruistic physician. For a patient with income Yi, expected utility
from treatment in the NHS then equals:
Eunhs = u[(1  m)Yi; qA] + (1  )u[(1  m)Yi; q] (7)
Consider a bundle of treatment quality q0 and cost w0 o¤ered by one or more
altruistic physicians in the private sector. Suppose that patients who apply
for treatment by an altruistic physician in the private sector who o¤ers this
treatment bundle have probability  to be matched to an altruistic physician.
Then, the expected utility of a patient with income Yi from applying for
treatment by an altruistic physician in the private sector equals:16
Eupriv = u[(1  m)Yi   w0; q0] + (1  )u[(1  m)Yi   c(qi ); qi ] (8)
16The choice of a single patient between the NHS and private health care a¤ects the cost
of public provision and, hence, the tax rate m. However, in a su¢ ciently large population
this e¤ect is small, and for notational convenience we assume throughout the paper that
individual patients neglect this tax e¤ect in deciding whether to opt for treatment in the
NHS or in the private sector.
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Di¤erentiating (7) and (8) with respect to Yi gives, using (1):
@Eunhs
@Yi
= (1  m)Uy[(1  m)Yi]
@Eupriv
@Yi
= (1  m)fUy[(1  m)Yi   w0] + (1  )Uy[(1  m)Yi   c(qi )]g
where the e¤ects through a change in qi are zero by the envelop theorem.
Using assumption 1 and Uyy < 0, it follows that for any , , and bundle
of treatment quality q0 and cost w0, we have for any given level of Yi that
@Eunhs
@Yi
<
@Eupriv
@Yi
.17 Hence, for any treatment bundle o¤ered by altruistic
physicians in the private sector, expected utility from private treatment in-
creases more strongly with income than expected utility from treatment in
the NHS.18 It follows that if there is any treatment bundle o¤ered by altru-
istic physicians in the private sector that makes that a patient with income
Yi prefers treatment in the private sector over treatment in the NHS, then
all patients with higher income also prefer treatment in the private sector.
Similarly, if given all treatment bundles o¤ered, a patient with income Yi
prefers treatment in the NHS, then all patients with lower income also prefer
the NHS over the private sector. It follows that given all treatment bundles
o¤ered in the private sector, there can be only one patient type indi¤erent
between treatment in the NHS and treatment in the private sector.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is given with the help of Figure 1, which
depicts patientsutility from treatment in the NHS and treatment the private
sector when all altruistic physicians work in the NHS. In the NHS, patients
receive either treatment quality qA or q, and, hence, the expected utility from
treatment in the NHS lies in between the two relatively at curves. Since
patients have to pay for treatment by a regular physician in the private sector
and Uyy < 0, utility from private sector treatment increases more strongly
with income than utility from NHS treatment. By denition, at income level
17Note that is it not possible that  = 1 and w0 = 0 simultaneously, since o¤ering costless
treatment in the private sector that is attractive to any patient attracts all patients who
prefer treatment in the NHS over treatment by a regular physician in the private sector.
This either violates  = 1 or the restriction that some patients must prefer treatment in
the NHS.
18Note that this argument also holds when altruistic physicians o¤er the same treatment
bundles as regular physicians or, equivalently, if no altruistic physician works in the private
sector.
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Figure 1: Patientsutility
]),()1[( ** iiim qqcYu --t
],)1[( Aim qYu t-
nhsEu
],)1[( qYu imt-
u
MY Y
YM the expected utility from treatment in the NHS equals the utility from
treatment by a regular physician in the private sector. Patients with income
above YM choose to buy treatment in the private sector, whereas patients
with income smaller than YM receive treatment in the public sector. This
yields yields tax rate m = F (YM )c(q)=
R YH
YL
Y f(Y )dY .
Now consider any treatment bundle o¤ered by an altruistic physician
in the private sector. By Uyy < 0 and assumption 1, the slope of a curve
depicting the utility derived from this treatment bundle cannot be atter
than the slopes of the curves describing the utility from treatment in the
NHS. Hence, treatment bundles o¤ered by altruistic physicians in the private
sector can shift YM to the left, but cannot solely attract the poorest patients.
Lemma 1 implies that in equilibrium the poorest patients are treated in
the NHS whereas the richest patients buy treatment in the private sector.
Hence, altruistic physicians know that if they decide to work in a private
practice, they will treat a relatively rich patient, whereas if they work for
the NHS, they get to treat a relatively poor patient. Proposition 1 gives the
equilibrium allocation of patients and altruistic physicians.
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Proposition 1 In an equilibrium where some patients choose treatment in
the NHS and other patients choose treatment in the private sector, all altru-
istic physicians work in the NHS. The allocation of patients is as described
by Lemma 1, with YM implicitly determined by:
N
F (YM )P
u[(1 m)YM ; qA]+

1  N
F (YM )P

u[(1 m)YM ; q] = u[(1 m)YM c(qM ); qM ]
(9)
This equilibrium exists if YL < YM < YH , which is satised when:
u[(1  m)YL; q] > u[(1  m)YL   c(qL); qL]
and
N
P
u[(1 m)YH ; qA]+

1  N
P

u[(1 m)YH ; q] < u[(1 m)YH c(qH); qH ]
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. By working for
the NHS, an altruistic physician can increase the utility of a relatively poor
patient who otherwise receives treatment quality q from a regular physician.
Alternatively, he can increase the utility of a relatively rich patient in the
private sector, by providing better quality at a lower price than the patient
otherwise buys from a regular physician. Since the treatment quality pro-
vided by regular physicians in the private sector must be higher than q,
the marginal benet of an increase in treatment quality is higher for NHS
patients than for private sector patients. Hence, for altruistic physicians,
providing better treatment quality than regular physicians is more reward-
ing when treating a patient in the NHS. Although altruistic physicians can
further increase the utility of patients in the private sector by o¤ering a
lower price for treatment than regular physicians, this additional instru-
ment is not e¤ective enough to outweigh the higher utility gain patients in
the NHS obtain from the increase in treatment quality.19
19 It immediately follows that if the private sector patients have bought private health
insurance, such that their cost of treatment is zero at the point of consumption, altruistic
physicians are even more inclined to treat NHS patients. Hence, allowing for private
insurance does not a¤ect the results.
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For patients, the equilibrium is captured in Figure 1. The presence
of altruistic physicians in the NHS makes treatment in the NHS attractive.
However, treatment quality is uncertain in the NHS (either qA or q), whereas
a patient buys a certain treatment quality in the private sector, as given by
(6). For su¢ ciently rich patients, even treatment by an altruistic physician
in the NHS is not good enough. Somewhat poorer patients do prefer treat-
ment by an altruistic physician in the NHS over treatment in the private
sector, but choose to buy treatment in the private sector so as to avoid the
possibility of being treated by a regular physician in the NHS. Still poorer
patients also prefer treatment by a regular physician in the private sector
over treatment by a regular physician in the NHS, but the di¤erence in util-
ity is small enough so that the presence of altruistic physicians in the NHS
makes it worthwhile to run the risk of ending up with treatment quality q.
The poorest fraction of patients simply prefers either treatment in the NHS
over treatment by a regular physician in the private sector.
4.3 Comparing purely public and mixed provision
Proposition 2 compares the purely public system of health care provision
with the mixed system of health care provision, from the patientspoint of
view.
Proposition 2 Allowing for private provision of health care benets all pa-
tients.
Proof. Under purely public provision, all patients have probability N=P
to receive treatment quality qA and otherwise receive quality q. Hence, the
expected utility of a patient with income Yi under public provision is:
Eu(y; q) =
N
P
u[(1  p)Yi; qA] +

1  N
P

u[(1  p)Yi; q] (10)
Proposition 1 has shown that under a mixed system of health care provi-
sion, i.e. when private provision of health care is allowed for, relatively
rich patients buy treatment in the private sector, even though all altruistic
physicians work in the NHS. This immediately implies that these patients
are better o¤ under the mixed system than under the purely public system,
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as otherwise they would not leave the NHS. Under mixed provision, patients
in the NHS have probability N=F (YM )P to be treated by an altruistic physi-
cian, implying that for a patient with income Yi the expected utility from
treatment in the NHS is given by:
Eunhs(y; q) =
N
F (YM )P
u[(1  m)Yi; qA] +

1  N
F (YM )P

u[(1  m)Yi; q]
(11)
As p > m and 0 < F (YM ) < 1, it follows that the expected utility of
treatment in the NHS is higher under mixed provision than under purely
public provision.
Intuitively, rich patients benet from private provision of health care, as
they are able to secure high-quality treatment in the private sector. The
withdrawal of the rich patients from the NHS benets the remaining NHS
patients in two ways. First, the tax rate decreases, as less patients make use
of the public service. Second, since all altruistic physicians optimally decide
to work in the NHS, the probability to be matched to an altruistic physi-
cian in the NHS increases. Hence, on average, NHS patients receive higher
treatment quality under mixed provision than under public provision.20
4.4 Subsidising private health care
Proposition 2 has shown that allowing for private provision of health care
alongside public provision benets relatively poor patients by attracting the
rich patients to the private sector. In other words, in expected terms a
patient in the NHS gains from a reduction in the number of her fellow NHS
patients. This suggests a role for subsidising private health care.
Suppose that every patient treated in the private sector receives a, possi-
bly negative, subsidy s, with the restriction that s should not be larger than
the cost of treatment. The total cost of health care provision then equals
20 If altruistic physicians place greater weight on the utility of relatively poor patients
than on the utility of richer patients, poor patients benet even more from private pro-
vision. As altruistic physicians infer that on average they treat a poorer patient under
mixed provision than under public provision, they optimally provide even better treatment
quality under mixed provision.
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fF (YM )c(q) + [1  F (YM )]sgP , yielding tax rate:
 s = fF (YM )c(q) + [1  F (YM )]sg=
Z YH
YL
Y f(Y )dY
It is easily veried that, analogous to Proposition 2, all patients prefer mixed
provision with any s  c(q) at which some patients seek treatment in the
private sector over a purely public system (or, equivalently, a prohibitive
tax on private treatment). Clearly, the patients opting for private care
are better o¤ by revealed preference. When s < c(q), all patients benet
from a reduced tax burden, as each patient treated in the private sector
reduces the cost of health care provision by c(q)  s. When s = c(q), mixed
provision is essentially a voucher system, where every patient receives a
voucher which can be used to obtain treatment quality q in both the NHS
and the private sector. The cost of this voucher system are identical to the
cost of a purely public system. However, the presence of altruistic physicians
in the NHS implies that the remaining patients in the NHS also strictly
prefer the voucher system over the purely public system, as the withdrawal
of the relatively rich patients from the pool of NHS patients increases their
probability of being treated by an altruistic physician.
Let us now consider the e¤ect of an increase in subsidy s. Given a subsidy
s, the expected utility of a patient with income Yi who opts for treatment
in the NHS is given by (11) with m replaced by  s. When treated in the
private sector, this patients utility equals
upriv(y; q) = U [(1   s)Yi   c(qi ) + s] + V (qi )
where qi is dened by the rst-order condition for optimal treatment quality
in the private sector (6) with (1   m)Yi = (1    s)Yi + s. Recall that by
denition, YM is the endogenously determined level of income at which a
patient is indi¤erent between treatment in the NHS and treatment in the
private sector.
The e¤ect of a marginal increase in s on the total cost of health care
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provision and, hence, on the tax rate is ambiguous:
@ s
@s
=
[c(q)  s]f(YM )@YM
@s
+ [1  F (YM )]R YH
YL
Y f(Y )dY
(12)
The rst term in the numerator gives the net savings from the reduction in
the number of patients treated in the NHS, and the second term gives the
increase in infra-marginal subsidies paid to the private sector patients. Using
(1), we nd that a marginal increase in s a¤ects the utility from treatment in
the NHS (11) through the tax rate and through a change in the probability
of treatment by an altruistic physician:
@Eunhs(y; q)
@s
=  Yi@ s
@s
Uy[(1  s)Yi]  Nf(YM )
PF (YM )2
@YM
@s
fV (qA) V (q)g (13)
The utility from private treatment is a¤ected directly by the change in the
subsidy and indirectly through the change in the tax rate (the e¤ect through
qi is zero by the envelop theorem):
@upriv(y; q)
@s
=

1  Yi@ s
@s

Uy[(1   s)Yi   c(qi ) + s] (14)
It follows that an increase in s reduces the number of patients treated
in the NHS. If YM would not change, the second term of (13) would van-
ish. However, since (1  YM [@ s=@s]) > 0 and Uy[(1    s)Yi   c(qi ) + s] 
Uy[(1    s)Yi] > 0 for all patients, that would imply that treatment in the
private sector becomes more attractive to patients with income YM relative
to treatment in the NHS.21 Hence, the patients who were indi¤erent at the
original level of s now prefer treatment in the private sector, implying that
YM must decrease: @YM=@s < 0.
If the e¤ect of the reduction of the number of NHS patients in (12)
outweighs the e¤ect of the increase in infra-marginal subsidies, then a higher
subsidy leads to lower cost of health care provision and, hence, lower taxes,
@ s=@s < 0. This implies that everyone benets from a higher subsidy, as
can be seen from (13) and (14). The increase in s reduces the (public) cost
21That (1  YM [@s=@s]) > 0 when @YM=@s = 0 follows from (12). For any YM < YH
it holds that
R YH
YM
Y f(Y )dY > [1  F (YM )]YM .
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of health care provision and increases the (expected) treatment quality for
all patients.
Now suppose that the increase in s increases total health care cost. From
(14), it follows that private sector patients generally benet from the higher
subsidy.22 NHS patients are hurt by the increase in the tax. However, (13)
shows that they may still benet from the higher subsidy, since the proba-
bility of receiving treatment from an altruistic physician increases. Hence,
for NHS patients, the presence of altruistic physicians makes subsidising
treatment in the private sector more appealing.
The discussion in this subsection is summarised in the Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 The presence of altruistic physicians increases the benets
of subsidising private provision of health care.
4.5 Moonlighting
We have assumed that under the mixed system, physicians either work for
the NHS or work in a private practice. In this subsection, we study the
e¤ects of allowing for moonlighting, i.e. allowing physicians to operate in a
private practice alongside their NHS job. This enables physicians to transfer
their NHS patients to their private practice, if this is mutually benecial.23
For a monopolistic doctor in the private sector, this gives an incentive to
select highly protable patients for treatment in the private sector (Barros
and Olivella, 2005, González, 2005). Ma (2004) and Biglaiser and Ma (2006)
show that moonlighting can increase e¢ ciency by enabling a patient and a
physician to share the surplus arising from a transfer to the private sector,
in a model where the number of patients who enter the NHS is xed.
In our framework, allowing for moonlighting benets some patients, but
has adverse e¤ects on the poorest patients by increasing the number of pa-
tients who (at least initially) opt for treatment in the NHS. As shown in
Figure 1, when moonlighting is not allowed relatively poor private sector
22 If the income distribution is su¢ ciently skewed, then it is possible that the increase
in taxes paid by patients with top incomes outweighs the increase in subsidy received.
23 In our setup, this is identical to assuming that patients in the NHS observe their
physicians type before treatment and are able to subsequently withdraw from the NHS
and enter the private sector.
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Figure 2: The e¤ect of moonlighting on patientsutility
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patients would obtain higher utility from treatment by an altruistic physi-
cian in the NHS than from their treatment in the private sector. They re-
frain from treatment in the NHS because they fear receiving the low-quality
treatment provided by regular physicians in the NHS. Similarly, for some
relatively rich NHS patients, the utility of treatment by a regular physician
in the private sector exceeds the utility of treatment by a regular physician
in the NHS.
Figure 2 extents Figure 1 to show the e¤ects of moonlighting. Allowing
for moonlighting implies that patients matched to a regular physician in
the NHS can choose between receiving quality q for free and buying their
optimal treatment quality in the private sector, as given by (6). Hence,
as depicted in Figure 2, all patients with income Yi > Y are willing to be
transferred to the private sector after being matched to a regular physician
in the NHS, where Y is implicitly dened by:
u[(1  m) Y ; q] = u[(1  m) Y   c(q); q]
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However, since the relatively poor private sector patients need not fear re-
ceiving treatment quality q anymore, more patients will apply for treatment
in the NHS, in the hope of receiving treatment from an altruistic physician.
In fact, all patients who obtain higher utility from treatment by an altruistic
physician in the NHS than from treatment a regular physician in the private
sector have an incentive to go to the NHS. This implies that the income at
which patients are indi¤erent between applying for treatment in the NHS
and in the private sector increases from YM to Y 0M , where Y
0
M is implicitly
dened by:
u[(1  m)Y 0M ; qA] = u[(1  m)Y 0M   c(q0M ); q0M ]
As regards patientsutility, Figure 2 shows that allowing for moonlight-
ing implies that the expected utility from opting for treatment in the NHS
shifts from Eunhs to Eu0nhs.
24 Clearly, relatively rich NHS patients as
well as private sector patients with income up to Y 0M benet from moon-
lighting. However, moonlighting harms the poorest patients. They do not
gain (enough) from the opportunity to buy higher quality treatment when
matched to a regular physician, and because more patients opt for treat-
ment in the NHS, they have a lower probability of receiving the high-quality
treatment provided by altruistic physicians.
Proposition 4 summarises the arguments made in this subsection.
Proposition 4 Allowing physicians to transfer NHS patients to their pri-
vate practice is benecial for patients with middle/high income, but harms
the poorest patients.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has shown that physicians who intrinsically care about patients
well-being favour working in the public sector over working in a private
practice. Altruistic physicians can have greater impact on patientswelfare
24Here, we abstract from changes in the tax rate. The e¤ect of allowing for moonlighting
on the total cost of health care provision is ambiguous. Without moonlighting, the cost are
c(q)F (YM )P . With moonlighting the cost are uncertain, as it depends on the matching of
physicians and patients. Expected cost are equal to c(q)fF ( Y )P + [1 F ( Y )=F (Y 0M )]Ng.
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by treating poor public sector patients than by treating rich private sector
patients, as the latter are able to buy high-quality treatment themselves.
This implies that allowing for private provision of health care also benets
the patients who cannot a¤ord treatment in a private practice. When the
rich buy high-quality treatment in the private sector, the remaining NHS
patients have a higher probability to be treated by one of the altruistic
physicians. Along the same lines, we have argued that subsidising private
provision of health care also benets patients are treated in the NHS, by
further increasing the number of patients who leave for the private sector.
Conversely, allowing physicians to transfer patients from the NHS to a pri-
vate practice harms the poorest patients, as the resulting increase in the
number of NHS patients implies that their probability of treatment by an
altruistic physician decreases.
We have assumed that physicians treat the same number of patients in
the NHS as in the private sector. Concavity of patients utility function
implies that altruistic physicians would prefer to improve the treatment of
many patients a little over greatly improving the treatment of a few. If
altruistic physicians could treat more patients in a private practice than in
the NHS, they may be tempted to work in the private sector. On the one
hand, a private practice may o¤er more exibility to increase working hours,
but on the other hand individual patients in the private sector may demand
more attention from their physician. Moreover, the NHS may guarantee a
steady inow of patients. And even if altruistic physicians can treat more
patients in a private practice, this has to make up for a less favourable
patient base.
By assuming a perfectly competitive private sector, homogeneous physi-
cian ability, and a su¢ cient total supply of physicians, making a prot in the
private sector has been made impossible. If (some) physicians could earn
prots in the private sector, for instance because of a scarce ability for pro-
viding high-quality treatment, then this would increase the attractiveness of
the private sector. Still, a highly able physician who also cares about patient
welfare faces a trade-o¤ between the prots obtained by treating patients in
a private practice and the intrinsically more rewarding treatment of patients
in the NHS. Hence, the existence of a private health care sector need not
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deprive the public sector of high-quality physicians.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that all altruistic physicians work in
the NHS. Given that condition (5) is satised, altruistic physicians optimally
provide treatment quality qA as implicitly dened by (4). Each NHS patient
has probabilityN=F (YM )P to receive treatment quality qA. Otherwise, NHS
patients receive quality q. Private sector patients with income Yi optimally
buy treatment quality qi from regular physicians, as implicitly dened by
(6). Hence, the level of income at which patients are indi¤erent between
NHS and private treatment, YM , is implicitly determined by the equality
in the proposition. Lemma 1 implies that patients with income Yi < YM
opt for treatment in the NHS and patients with income Yi > YM prefer
treatment in the private sector.
Patients are being treated in both the NHS and the private sector if
YL < YM < YH . The rst inequality in the Proposition states that the
poorest patient must prefer treatment in the NHS over treatment in the
private sector even when N = 0. Similarly, the second inequality in the
Proposition states that patients with income YH must prefer treatment in
the private sector if all other patients are treated in the NHS.
Lastly, we have to proof that given this allocation of patients, altruis-
tic physicians prefer to work in the NHS. Consider an individual altruistic
physician choosing between the NHS and the private sector. Substituting
optimal treatment quality qA into (3) and using (1) gives the utility of an
altruistic physician from working in the NHS:
ZA = c(q)  c(qA) + [V (qA)  V (q)] (A1)
Alternatively, the altruistic physician can work in the private sector.
When he o¤ers a bundle of treatment quality q0 and cost w0, all private
sector patients for whom it holds that this treatment bundle yields higher
utility than treatment by a regular physician, u[(1  m)Yi w0; q0] > u[(1 
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m)Yi   c(qi ); qi ], will apply for treatment by the altruistic physician.25
Here, we derive that even if the altruistic physician could provide his private
sector patient with the optimal treatment bundle for this patient type, the
altruistic physician prefers to treat a NHS patient rather than any patient in
the private sector. Obviously, o¤ering one or more treatment bundles which
are optimal for certain patient types also attract other patient types, and
to discourage some patients types from applying the altruistic physician
may optimally distort treatment bundles. As this implies that treating a
patient in the private sector brings about even lower expected utility for the
altruistic physician than we derive below, the ndings below are su¢ cient to
proof that altruistic physicians indeed prefer to work in the NHS, as stated
in the Proposition.
Providing treatment quality q0i at cost w
0
i to a patient with income Yi 2
[YM ; YH ] yields utility:
ZA = w0i  c(q0i)+ fu[(1  m)Yi w0i; q0i] u[(1  m)Yi  c(qi ); qi ]g (A2)
where we have used that the outside option of the patient is treatment
by a regular physician in the private sector, yielding utility u[(1  m)Yi  
c(qi ); q

i ]. Maximising (A2) with respect to q
0
i and w
0
i, subject to u(y; q)  uo,
gives rst-order conditions:
 cq(q0i) + Vq(q0i) = 0 (A3)
1  Uy[(1  m)Yi   w0i] = 0 (A4)
From (A3), it follows that the optimal treatment quality is independent
of income. Moreover, the optimal quality is equal to the optimal quality
provided by altruistic physicians in the NHS, qA, as (A3) is identical to (4),
the rst-order condition for altruistic physiciansoptimal treatment quality
in the public sector. Substituting for the optimal treatment bundle a patient
with income Yi obtains from a regular physician and using (6), we nd that
25As all private sector patients not treated by an altruistic physician will be treated by
a regular physician, they optimally apply for treatment by an altruistic physician when
this gives higher utility than treatment by a regular physician, even if the probability to
be matched to an altruistic physician is innitesimal.
25
both rst-order conditions imply that the altruistic physician improves his
patients utility when:
Vq(q

i ) > cq(q

i ) (A5)
If this inequality is violated, the altruistic physician would optimally o¤er the
same treatment bundle to a patient with income Yi as regular physicians.
Otherwise, i.e. when  is su¢ ciently high, the altruistic physician o¤ers
both higher treatment quality and lower treatment cost to a patient with
income Yi than regular physicians. Note that since qi increases with income,
condition (A5) is satised for smaller values of  for patients with relatively
low income than for patients with higher income.
Clearly, the altruistic physician prefers treating a NHS patient over pro-
viding the same treatment bundle as regular physicians to a patient in the
private sector, as the latter does not yield altruistic utility. Comparing (5) to
(A5), it is easily veriable that for some levels of , the altruistic physician
optimally refrains from improving the utility of any patient in the private
sector but does improve the utility of NHS patients. By (9), q < qi for all
patients in the private sector. It follows that cq(qi )  cq(q) and concavity
implies that Vq(qi ) < Vq(q). Hence, for some values of  condition (5) is
satised, but condition (A5) is violated, implying that for these values of 
altruistic physicians prefer to work in the NHS.
Now suppose that  is su¢ ciently high, such that (A5) is satised for
at least some private sector patients. Again, treating a patient for whom
condition (A5) is violated is less rewarding than treating a NHS patient.
By (A3), (A5) is violated if a patient optimally buys treatment quality
qi  qA when treated by a regular physician. Consider any patient for
whom condition (A5) is satised. We have to show that even if the altruistic
physician could provide the optimal treatment bundle to his private sector
patient, treating a patient in the NHS is more rewarding than treating any
patient in the private sector. Subtracting (A2) with q0i = q
A from (A1) and
using (1), this implies that we have to show that:
[V (qi ) V (q)] > w0i  c(q)+ fU [(1  m)Yi w0i] U [(1  m)Yi  c(qi )]g
(A6)
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for all patients with income Yi 2 [YM ; YH ] for whom condition (A5) is sat-
ised, where w0i is given by (A4). From assumption 1 and by combining
conditions (6), (A4), and (A5), we know that 0  w0i < c(qi ).
First, suppose that w0i = c(q

i ). The last term on the right-hand side of
(A6) vanishes, and the condition boils down to [V (qi )   V (q)] > c(qi )  
c(q). This is always satised, as if (A5) is fullled we have that qi < q
A,
and from (A3) we know that Vq(q) > cq(q) for any q < qA. Altruistic
physicians are willing to incur the cost of increasing treatment quality up
to qA. Second, suppose that 0  w  c(q). It su¢ ces to show that V (qi ) 
V (q) > U [(1   m)Yi   w0i]   U [(1   m)Yi   c(qi )]. From Figure 1, we
know that private sector patients prefer treatment by a regular physician
in the private sector over treatment by a regular physician in the NHS,
u [(1  m)Yi   c(qi ); qi ] > u [(1  m)Yi; q] for all Yi 2 [YM ; YH ], i.e. all
private sector patients are willing to pay c(qi ) for an increase in treatment
quality from q to qi . Using (1), this implies that condition (A6) is satised.
Lastly, suppose that c(q) < w0i < c(q

i ). Let q
w be the treatment quality
provided by a regular physician in the private sector in exchange for w0i, as
given by w0i = c(q
w). From the two arguments of the previous paragraph, it
follows from (A3) that [V (qw)  V (q)] > c(qw)  c(q) as qw < qA and that
 [V (qi )  V (qw)] > fU [(1 m)Yi w0i] U [(1 m)Yi c(qi )]g as private
sector patients are willing to pay c(qi )   w0i for an increase in treatment
quality from qw to qi . Hence, for any w
0
i condition (A6) is satised. This
implies that even when the altruistic physician can provide the optimal
treatment bundle to a private sector patient, treating a patient in the NHS
yields higher utility than treating any patient in the private sector. Hence,
all altruistic physicians optimally work in the NHS.
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